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CASE COMMENTS

The Ithaca case, a United States Supreme Court decision, has not
been expressly overruled even partially by the Supreme Court so as
to conform to the limitations set forth in the Revenue Ruling or
the cited cases. Further, the decisions which have employed the
limitations 'have ,been in inferior courts. The final decision regarding the -intendment of the statute rests with the Supreme Court. It
should 'be construed in such a way as to make for certainty and
uniformity in its application.
Robert Glenn Lilly, Jr.

Evidence-Past Recollection Recorded-Present
Recollection Revived
Upon prosecution for murder in the first degree D objects to
the use by two witnesses of documents -upon which his alleged confession to the crime was recorded. Both witnesses read their notes
verbatim after testifying that they could achieve greater accuracy
from the notes than from their recollection alone or their recollection refreshed by the notes. Held, it is not error to allow a witness
to read a faithful memorandum where he is devoid of a present
recollection 'but possesses an accurate account of the events made by
him at the time of their occurrence. Hall v. State, 162 A.2d 751
(Md. 1960).
The instant case states clearly and concisely the best and most
widely accepted view concerning a field of evidence which has in
the past been the subject of much misunderstanding. 3 WIGMoRE,
EVMENCE § 735 (3d ed. 1940). It is impossible to discuss past
recollection recorded -without also considering the concept known
as present recollection revived. It is this interrelation which has
caused the courts some 'trouble in distinguishing between the two.
Hall v. State, supra, clearly involves a case of past recollection recorded. Here both witnesses testified that they could not remember
clearly the contents of the confession, but both testified that they
could remember having made accurate recordings of the defendant's
statements at he time of their occurrence. The value of such testimony is readily discernible, the frailty of the human memory gives
impetus to the acceptance of this rule 'by the courts, and the ends
of justice are best served by its use.
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The terminology used to distinguish these two concepts appears
to have been first used by Professor Wigmore in his treatise on evidence, wherein he discusses the -twoconcepts. The use of past recollection recorded envisions a situation in which 'the witness 'has no present
memory concerning an event, but does recall having recorded the
event by note or memorandum at the time. Whereupon the record
is produced, sworn to 'be correct 'by the witness, and then read into
the record. Use of such evidence is generally allowed, but some
jurisdictions have imposed restrictions on the doctrine. In New
York past recollection recorded may not be used until it is shown
that no present recollection exists at all. National Bank v. Madden,
114 N.Y. 280, 21 N.E. 408 (1889). While in Massachusetts the
rule is recognized but limited to Tegular entries in the course of business. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 734, 736, 758 (3d ed. 1940).
The latter resriction apparently has some authority in West
Virginia. In the case of Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301 (1883),
the question was raisedas -to whether a copy of an invoice was admissible in evidence when read by a party who was present at the
time when the invoice was copied but not when it was originally
written. The West Virginia court held, citing several Massachusetts
decisions, that such a memorandum made in the regular course of
business stands upon a different footing from that of a mere private
memorandum. The former is admissible in evidence, even though
the original transcriber be deceased, upon proof of handwriting.
But if the party is still alive the case holds, at page 309: ".... though

he remembers and can testify nothing about the facts recorded in
the entry but simply testifies that 'he made the entry in the usual
course of business at 'the time of the transaction, such entry is of
itself primary evidence of the -facts recorded." But, when the memorandum -is one other than one made -in the regular course of business, the court emphasized that such a record could not itself be
evidence and as such given to the jury. Such a record could be
used 'by the witness to refresh his memory, but, added the court
"still it is ,the statement of the witness -and not the private memorandum or entry which is evidence."
One must keep in mind that past recollection recorded of necessity involves no present recollection of the witness whatsoever, and
the document itself is the primary source of the testimony. The
West Virginia court committed the not too uncommon error of
confusing these two concepts. It would apparently limit -the ap-
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plication of the past recollection recorded concept to memoranda
made in the regular course of business. Where the entry is a
private memorandum, it is quite clear that the court would allow
the witness to refresh his memory from the document but would
not allow it to be entered in evidence. But to hold that the memorandum may 'be read, and by -thisit is assumed to be a verbatim reading,
by the witness yet still be inadmissible in evidence is fallacious. If
the court would allow the memorandum to be read then why keep
the document itself out? The court is correct in not allowing a
memorandum from which the witness merely refreshes his memory
as he testifies to be admitted, but it is incorrect in its statement that
the memorandum may be read evidently verbatim and still not be
admissible itself. More signifie'nt, 'however, than the mere admission
of the private memorandum in evidence where its use is only that of
refreshment, is the apparent limiting of the doctrine of past recollection recorded to business entries only. Vinal v. Gilman, supra, has
been cited in a long line of 'holdings as a correct statement of the
law, both as to shop book entries and as to the -two evidence concepts under discussion. For the most part the situations involved
present recollection revived, 'but apparently there is -no direct holding
that -would extend the doctrine of past recollection recorded beyond
business entries in regularly kept books. Di Bacco v. Benedetto, 82
W. Va. 94, 95 S.E. 601 (1918); Deitz v. McVey, 77 W. Va. 601, 87
S.E. 926 (1916); Sand Co. v. Smith, 76 W. Va. 246, 85 S.E. 513
(1915).
However, in a later West Virginia case, where a witness in a
second trial was unable to recall much about the events of the crime,
examining counsel was allowed to use the transcript of the prior
trial in order to refresh his memory. The court by dicta seemed to
indicate that the use of past recollection recorded extends to all
memoranda whether made in the regular course of business or not.
Although no subsequent cases were 'found relating specifically to this
point, it is hoped that the practice 'has been adopted through usage.
But should the West Virginia court later restrict the use of such
memoranda to business transactions only, as the implication of prior
cases apparently does, the result 'would be a needless restriction upon
an extremely valuable procedure. State v. Legg, 59 W. Va. 315, 53
S.E. 545 (1906).
As stated 'before, discussion of past recollection recorded necessarily requires a discussion of present recollection revived. The West
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Virginia court has had -a little less trouble with this principle than
with its apparent double. State v. Legg, supra, which deals directly
with this point holds: "The testimony of a witness upon a preliminary
examination of one accused of a crime may be used by the witness
upon trial of such accused person for the purpose of refreshing his
memory." Usage of -the concept of present recollection revived is
further ,bolstered in West Virginia by -a succession of cases dealing
with 'books of original entry. State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 667, 691,
128 S.E. 116 (1925); Architects & Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va.
506, 70 S.E. 113 (1911). Similarly, a case allowing the testimony
of a nurse, who 'had refreshed 'her memory as to the number of persons visiting the plaintiff's room by use of the bed chart, was held
proper. Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 589, 111 S.E. 492
(1922).
The use of notes by a witness to refresh his memory -immediately
raises the danger of a witness being given a script from which to
testify. The threat of such sharp practice has given rise to inspection
of the notes so used either by opposing counsel or 'by -the trial judge.
3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 111 (3d ed. 1940). Even so, the process
of refreshing the memory by notes is comparatively unrestricted save
by the use of common sense.
From the cases it would appear that the doctrines of past recollection recorded and present recollection revived are established in
this state in varying degrees. Concerning the latter, there is little
doubt, but some confusion does exist among 'the cases as to past
recollection recorded. As stated before, this doctrine is extremely
useful and instances of its applicability should come readily to mind.
Perhaps a clear affirmation of it by the West Virginia court would be
appropriate some time in the future.
John George Van Meter

Income Tax-Alimony-Payment for Months
Prior to Divorce Decree Not Deductible
In May 1953 while a divorce action was pending, the respondent
and his wife entered into an agreement 'by which the respondent
agreed to pay his wife $30,000 annually in advance beginning in
February of that year. In June an interlocutory divorce decree was
entered, and in September this divorce decree became final. On the
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